

# Pirates Are Watching the Clouds

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**FORMULA**

Modeling Foundations.



# 1. Introduction

<http://research.microsoft.com/formula>

<http://research.microsoft.com/~ejackson/wicsa2011>



# Big Systems Need Formal Methods

Unlike a single algorithm/method we want to understand system-level properties that are hard to reason about using only code.



**Ex 1:** Users want to run their apps in the cloud.

**Problem:** The data center needs to find deployments in the presence of constraints .

**Solution:** **Model apps and constraints** and synthesize deployments.



**Ex 2:** Integrated web-services that use each others data to make decisions.

**Problem:** The pirates want to know if they can exploit the decision process.

**Solution:** **Model how decisions are made** and find suspicious scenarios, so correct flaws early.



# A Formal Specification Language

FORMULA is a formal specification language targeting model-based development, shaped by the following scenarios:

## **Declarative Specifications of:**

Rule-based systems (*e.g. policy languages*)

Good Configurations of Complex Systems (*e.g. clouds*)

Classes of Software Architectures (*e.g. embedded systems*)

Deployment Problems of Architectures to Compute Fabrics (*e.g. schedulable deployments*)

## **Automated Reasoning on Specifications for:**

Design space exploration,

Bounded symbolic model checking,

Test-case Generation,

Consistency Checking



# Core: ADTs + Open World CLP

## **Algebraic data types**

plus novel regular type inference for representing abstractions.

## **Strongly Typed Bottom-up Constraint Logic Programming**

for describing the logic of the abstraction.

## **Open World Semantics by Efficient Symbolic Execution to SMT**

to find diverse solutions to the problem.

## **Module System with Formal Composition Operators**

for safely building complex specifications.

## 2. Deploying to a Cloud


<http://research.microsoft.com/formula>

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**FORMULA**



Modeling Foundations.






# Applications (I)

For simplicity, assume an application is just a task.  
Two tasks can be in conflict, meaning they should not execute on the same node.





# Applications (II)

*The "domain" keyword starts and abstraction*



```
domain Applications
```

```
{
```

```
  App ::= (id: String).
```

```
  [Closed]
```

```
  Conflict ::= (t1: App, t2: App).
```

```
}
```

*Data type constructors with labeled arguments and type constraints*



*A "model" is claim of conformance*



```
model ApplicationModel of Applications
```

```
{
```

```
  t1 is App("HBI Database")
```

```
  t2 is App("Web Server")
```

```
  t3 is App("Voice Recognition")
```

```
  Conflict(t1, t2)
```

```
  Conflict(t2, t3)
```

```
}
```

*And a set terms built using data type constructors*




Apps

Map

Cloud








# The Cloud (I)


Nodes are connected by channels with communication capacities.  
No node can support more than two incoming and outgoing channels.  
Capacities must be balanced on node with incoming and outgoing channels.



Apps

Map

Cloud



# The Cloud (II)

*Special annotations  
for common  
constraints*

```
domain Cloud {  
  Node      ::= (id: Integer).  
  [Closed(fromNode, toNode)]  
  [Unique(fromNode, toNode -> cap)]  
  Channel ::= (fromNode: Node, toNode: Node,  
              cap: PosInteger).
```

*Named "queries"  
can be treated like  
Boolean variables.*

```
bigFanIn  := n is Node, count(Channel(_,n,_)) > 2.  
bigFanOut := n is Node, count(Channel(n,_,_)) > 2.
```

*Rules derive  
complex  
information*


```
mustBal(n) :- Channel(_,n,_), Channel(n,_,_).
```

```
clog := mustBal(n),  
      sum(Channel(_,n,_),2) !=  
      sum(Channel(n,_,_),2).
```

*The "conforms"  
query determines  
the models.*


```
conforms := !(bigFanIn | bigFanOut | clog).  
}
```






# Deployments (I)

Tasks should be placed on nodes so all conflict constraints are respected.





# Deployments (II)

*The "extends" keyword safely composes*

```
▶ domain Deployment extends Applications, Cloud
{
  [Closed] [Function(fromApp -> toNode)]
  Binding ::= (fromApp: App, toNode: Node).

  inConflict := Binding(t1, n), Binding(t2, n),
               Conflict(t1, t2).

  conforms   := !inConflict.
}
```


*Only need to write the new constraints.*

Simplified example, but not an easy one:

*A coloring problem,  
A forbidden-subgraph problem  
Linear arithmetic problems*

Realistic problems contain constraints like these.





# Solve in Any Direction

The user constructs a partial model to represent the degrees of freedom in the problem. Degrees of freedom can be anywhere.

```
partial model Ex of Deployment
```

```
{
```

```
  t1 is App("HBI Database")
```

```
  t2 is App("Web Server")
```

```
  t3 is App("Voice Recognition")
```

```
  Conflict(t1, t2)
```

```
  Conflict(t2, t3)
```

```
  n1 is Node(1)
```

```
  n2 is Node(2)
```

```
  n3 is Node(3)
```

```
  c1 is Channel c2 is Channel c3 is Channel
```

```
  c4 is Channel c5 is Channel c6 is Channel
```

```
  c7 is Channel c8 is Channel c9 is Channel
```

```
}
```


*Entities that must  
be in any solution*

*Explicit degrees of  
freedom. There  
are also implicit  
degrees of  
freedom, like  
binding.*



# Design Space Exploration

Given a spec and a partial model, then symbolic execution constructs a formula representing the design space.



## 3. Pirates and Loop-Holes


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


# Integration of Web Services


A social networking site has rules for friend recommendations

But integrates data from other sites, importing their rules into its trust boundary.

The pirate uses this composition to try to gain your trust.








# Rules of the Social Network

```
domain Principals
```

```
{  
  Person ::= (first: String, last: String).  
}
```

```
domain SocNetwork extends Principals
```


```
{  
  [Closed]  
  Friend      ::= (Person, Person).  
  isDirectFriend ::= (Person, Person).  
  isFofF      ::= (Person, Person).  
  
  isDirectFriend(p1, p2),  
  isDirectFriend(p2, p1) :- Friend(p1, p2).  
  isFofF(p1, p2)         :- isDirectFriend(p1, p2).  
  isFofF(p1, p2)         :- isFofF(p1, p), isFofF(p, p2).  
  recFriend(p1, p2)      :- isFofF(p1, p2), p1 != p2,  
                           fail isDirectFriend(p1, p2).  
  
  recAndNotFofF := recFriend(p1, p2), p1 != p2, fail isFofF(p1, p2).  
}
```



# Can Eve Do Anything Suspicious?

Maybe she can even make up her last name...


```
partial model Net of SocNetwork
{
  pEve   is Person("Eve", _)
  pBob   is Person("Bob", "Bob")
  pChuck is Person("Chuck", "Chuck")
  pAlice is Person("Alice", "Alice")
  Friend(pAlice, pBob)
  Friend(pBob, pChuck)
}
```



# The Family Tree Website

```
domain FamilyTree extends Principals
{
  [Closed]
  Database ::= (Person).
  isRelated ::= (Person, Person).


  isRelated(p1, p2) :- Database(p1), Database(p2),
                       p1.last = p2.last, p1 != p2.
}
```



# The Integration

```
domain Integration extends SocNetwork, FamilyTree
{
    recFriend(p1, p2) :- isRelated(p1, p2).
}
```

```
[Introduce(Database, 4)]
partial model NetInt of Integration
{
    pEve    is Person("Eve", _)
    pBob    is Person("Bob", "Bob")
    pChuck  is Person("Chuck", "Chuck")
    pAlice  is Person("Alice", "Alice")
    Friend(pAlice, pBob)
    Friend(pBob, pChuck)
}
```



# A Suspicious Scenario

Not a bug in the usual sense, but a scenario that should be carefully considered.

```
model NetInt_1 of Integration at "../WICSAExamples.4ml"
{
  Person("Alice", "Alice")
  Person("Bob", "Bob")
  Person("Chuck", "Chuck")
  Person("Eve", "Chuck")

  Friend(Person("Alice", "Alice"), Person("Bob", "Bob"))
  Friend(Person("Bob", "Bob"), Person("Chuck", "Chuck"))

  Database(Person("Bob", "Bob"))
  Database(Person("Chuck", "Chuck"))
  Database(Person("Eve", "Chuck"))
}
```



# Some Use-Cases

## **Automotive Embedded Systems**

Design space exploration over end-to-end assembly of components satisfying temporal and dataflow constraints (pilot with automotive industry).

## **Verifying Model Transformations**

Transformations re-write high-level architecture, but want to verify they don't perturb correctness. What happens to correctness if we introduce triple-redundancy.

## **Reasoning About Policy Languages**

Show how large sets of policies interact by generating configurations causes the policy to react in some way (pilot project with internal product groups).

## **DSE to Optimization**

Use DSE loop combined with simulation-based ranking to find optimal designs w.r.t to system dynamics.

# Thank you and Questions

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